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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GLENN BRIGGS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
F. W. HESS and ALICE' HESS, 
his wife, 
Defendants and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
On the lOth day of May, 1947, Laura Tree also known 
as L. Tree and as L. T. Zitting filed a suit to quiet title in 
the District Court of Box Elder County, State of Utah, 
(Civil No. 6586, defendant's exhibit No. 1) against one F. 
W. Hess and Alice Hess, his wife, and others. On the 8th 
day of May, 1948, the said F. W. Hess and Alice Hess, his 
wife, executed a warranty deed to Glenn Briggs, the plain-
tiff and respondent herein, for a valuable consideration. 
This deed was duly recorded in the office of the County Re-
corder of Box Elder County, Utah, on the 28th day of May, 
1948, in Book 57 of Deeds at page 364. On November 19th, 
1949, the District Court of Box Elder County in the suit re-
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ferred to above, entered a judgment quieting title to the 
lands in controversy herein, in Laura Tree also known as 
L. Tree and L. 'I'. Zitting, a certified copy of said decree be-
ing recorded in the office of the County Recorder of Box 
Elder County, Utah, on the 20th day of December, 1949, in 
Book 1 of Miscellaneous Deeds, page 357 (see exhibits B 
and 1). 
That after plaintiff learned that said decree had been 
entered, declaring the title of his said grantors, the defen-
dants herein, invalid, that he made demand upon his gran-
tors, the defendants herein, that they repurchase said lands 
and make good their warranty. That the defendants failed 
to purchase said property and make good their warranty ; 
that the plaintiff, in order to protect said property and keep 
possession thereof, had to repurchase it from the other 
parties and sue the defendants herein for the damage that 
he suffered. 
The defendant admitted all of the allegations in plain-
tiff's complaint except paragraphs 6 and 7 and denied these 
paragraphs for lack of knowledge. At the hearing and par-
ticularly the pre-trial, attorney for defendant (R.25) admit-
ted that the amount claimed paid by plaintiff for the pur-
chase price was correct. 
Consequently the only issue raised by the pleadings 
was whether or not the defendants failed to clear the title 
so as to make good their warranty deed and the amount of 
the attorneys fees. The evidence offered before the court 
(R.27) showed that Mr. Briggs paid $484.68 to get the title 
back and the evidence offered as to reasonable attorneys 
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:iets \.h .• 00) was ~126.vu. '.i'he u1uy evidence oU:ered 1n re-
buttle was the tax deed lH..o~) otfered by lVlr.lVlason and the 
tile in the previous case between Hess and Laura Tree, 
(R.34) which previous action determined that lVlr. Hess had 
no title to the property. There was a discussion about the 
pleading (R.35) where the attorney for plaintiff made the 
statement to the court, that the Quit Claim Deed from Box 
Elder County and the Civil Case No. 6586 of Laura Tree et 
al vs. Hess, offered by the defendants, was admitted by 
plaintiff for the purpose of showing that the matter had 
been litigated and Hess determined to have no title and that 
all parties claiming under him were estopped from claiming 
their title through him and were not admitted for the pur-
pose of showing any affirmative defense, as none was 
pleaded. There was no proof offered by defendants as to 
the circumstances under which Hess sold the property to 
the plaintiff Briggs, that is, whether or not he knew there 
was a suit pending; whether or not he had paid any taxes 
since the deed was originally issued to him by the defendant 
Hess; and whether or not Briggs claimed to be a bona fide 
purchaser for value without knowledge of the suit. On the 
11th day of August, 1951, Briggs in order to protect said 
property and after notice being given to Hess that he could 
not afford to lose said property and would have to re-
purchase it if Hess did not, purchased the said property and 
brought the suit for damage. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS: 
POINT I. THE MATTER RELIED ON BY DEFEND-
ANTs· IN THIS APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME', TO-WIT, 
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THAT NU LIS PEND~.NS WAS .. F1lliV AND '!HAT TH~ 
PLAINTIFF' IitUGGS WA.S A .BONA .F'1D~ .PU.UCHA~Elt 
FOR VALUE, I~ RAISED :F'UR THE }i~RST TllVfE ON AP-
PEAL AND IS AN AFFlHrMATl VE 1J~!i''J£N~.C.: AND lVIUS'l' 
BE SPECIALLY PLEADED. 
POINT II. T'HAT IF AN AF"'.F''IRMATIVE DEFENSE 
COULD BE RAISED NOW, FOR THE FIRST TIME, 
WHICH PLAINTIFF DENIES, THEN THE DEFENDANT 
IN SAID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE MUST BEAR THE 
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A !BONA 
FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT KNOW-
LEDGE OF THE LITIGATION, THEN PENDING AT THE 
TIME OF PURCHASE, AND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HAD GOOD TITLE AND THAT THE SAME PASSED 
WITH HIS CONVEYANCE. 
POINT III. THAT WHEN THE· DISTRICT COURT 
IN CIVIL SUIT No. 6586 (DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT No. 
1) DECLARED THE TAX TITLE OF F. W. HESS, NULL 
AND VOID, THAT HIS WARRANTY OF TITLE THEN 
FAILED. THAT ANY GRANTEE OF HESS, WHETHER 
HE CLAIMED TO BE A BONA FIDE· PURCHASER OR 
NOT WOULD NOT HAVE ANY BETTER TITLE THAN 
HESS, AND HESS HAD NONE'. UNDER SUCH GIR-
CUMSTANCES THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANT-
ING JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT. 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT 1. THE· MATTER RELIED ON BY DEFEN-
DANTS IN THIS APPEAL FOR THE FIRST TIME, TO-
WIT, THAT NO LIS PENDENS WAS FILED AND THAT 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE PLAINTIFF BRIGGS WAS A BONA FIDE PUR-
CHASER FOR VALUE, IS RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME 
ON APPEAL AND IS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE AND 
MUST BE SPECIALLY PLEADED. 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8, Sub-paragraph 
C, reads as follows : 
"Affirmative Defenses. In pleading to a preced-
ceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirma-
tively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and 
award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence, 
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure 
of consideration, fraud, illegality, injury by fellow 
servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judi-
cata, statute of frauds, statute of limitations, 
waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoid-
ance or affirmative defense." 
This Court is invited to review again the pleading (R. 1 to 
23) to see if it is possible to construe that an affirmative 
defense of this nature has been pleaded. There is nothing 
but a general denial of a part of the original complaint. 
Plaintiff and Respondent submits that such affirma-
tive matter cannot now be raised for the first time before. 
this court. 
POINT II. THAT IF AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
COULD BE RAISED NOW, FOR THE: FIRST TIME, 
WHICH PLAINTIFF DENIES, THEN THE. DEFENDANT 
IN SAID AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE MUST BEAR THE 
BURDEN OF PROVING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS A BONA 
FIDE PURCHASER FOR VALUE WITHOUT KNOW-
LEDGE OF THE LITIGATION THEN PENDING AT THE 
TIME OF PURCHASE AND THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HAD GOOD TITLE AND THAT THE' SAME PASSED 
WITH HIS CONVEYANCE. 
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It is appellant's contention that if no lis pendens was 
put on record by the party plaintiff, sueing the present de-
fendant in a previous suit, that then any person so long as 
that lis pendens was not on record would be a bona fide pur-
chaser and would be free from the effect of the litigation 
then pending before the court. In Thompson on Real Prop. 
erty, Volumn 8, Article No. 4510, page 398, we have the 
following: 
"----. On the other hand, one who purchases 
with actual notice of the pendency of a suit affect-
ing the land can not object that statutory notice of 
the pendency of the suit was not filed." 
The cases cited in support of this are numerous. 
Consequently under this great array of decisions, the appel-
lant if he has asserted such affirmative defense must also 
prove every step and one is, that even in the absence of a lis 
pendens heing filed he must also show that the present 
plaintiff, Briggs, had no actual notice of the pendency of the 
suit between his grantor and Laura Tree et al. The record 
is absolutely silent upon this point. Our section 104-5-16 
Utah Cide Annotated 1943 is taken from the California 
Civil Code and is practically the same word for word. I re-
fer you at this time to 16. Cal. Jur. page 647 under the gen-
eral heading of Lis Pendens, and we have, 
" ---- . As already intimated, one who with ac-
tual notice of the pendency of a suit purchases the 
property involved in an action from a party there-
to is concluded by a judgment against the party he 
derived title from, irrespective of the filing of no-
tice of lis pendens." 
Then a copy of the California Code is set out on page 648 
of said volume. Utah has followed this same theory and 
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in the Whittaker vs. Greenwood, 17 Utah, 333, 53 Pacific 
736 referred to by appellant, and set out in the foot notes 
under our Section 104-5-16, Utah Code Annotated 1943. We 
find on page 736, 
"----. It does not in any way change rule of law 
relating to actual notice thereof nor effect of such 
actual notice on parties dealing with or obtaining 
possession or title to land in litigation." 
In that case the party had actual notice, but claimed the 
right to ignore the decision of the court because of failure 
to file lis pendens, but the Supreme Court held otherwse. 
Under Article 4 of the same foot note of the annotator we 
have constructive notice had as a result of filing of notice 
of lis pendens, is the equivalent of actual notice. Dupee v. 
Salt Lake Valley Loan and Trust Co. 20 U. 103, 57 P. 845, 
77 Am. St. Rep. 902. This last case is cited by appellant, 
but his quotation falls short of the meat of the decision. 
The complete quotation found on page 847 is as follows: 
"The object of notice of lis pendens is to keep the 
subject of the suit, or res, within the power and 
control of the court until judgment or decree shall 
be entered, so that courts can give effect to their 
judgments, and the public shall have notice of the 
pendency of the action. Lis pendens may be defin-
ed to be the jurisdiction, power, or control which 
courts acquire over property involved in a suit 
pending the continuance of the action, and until its 
final judgment therein. This constructive notice 
of filing the complaint as required by the statute 
is equivalent to actual notice." 
The facts of the above case are not similar to ours, 
their being a partial mortgage foreclosure and the lis pen-
dens being filed and setting said matter out so that anyone 
purchasing under the partial foreclosure took title subject 
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to another and superior lien. They did however say that the 
lis pendens is nothing more than a form of constructive 
notic-e, equivalent under the law to actual notice. 
Appellant contends, page 5 of this brief, that the Dis-
trict Court lost jurisdiction over the :Property because of the 
fact that the previous owner, the defendant in this action, 
had conveyed the property away while the suit was in liti-
gation. The cases cited to support this doctrine are just 
Whittaker vs. Greenwood 53 Pac. 736, Dupee vs. Salt Lake 
Valley Loan and Trust Co. 57 Pac. 845 and Doris Trust Co. 
vs. Quermback et al133 Pac. 2d 1003. I have searched these 
cases carefully and not one of them had the question of 
jurisdiction over the subject matter being lost, on account 
of failure to file a lis pendens, before the court. The last 
case cited by appellent being Doris Trust Co. vs. Quermbach 
et al133 Pac. 2nd 1003, in the majority opinion had nothing 
whatever to say about a lis pendens and in Justce Wolfe's 
concurring opinion on page 1006 he referred to a recorded 
notice that had been placed on the record and discussed 
whether it could be considered as a purported lis pendens 
and determined it could not be. Under appellants theory 
any party being sued to determine rights in real property, 
could connive with a buyer if no lis pendens had been filed 
and defeat the court of its jurisdiction over the subject 
matter. I can find nothing in the law that would even in-
timate such a doctrine and on the contrary I find in 16. Cal. 
Jur. page 652 under the heading of Actual Notice, which is 
as follows: 
"Article 8. Actual Notice. 
Actual notice of the pendency of an action is as 
effective as constructive notice under the statute. 
It is a general rule that notice of facts sufficient 
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to put one on inquiry is notice of all facts to which 
inquiry would lead. The notic·e need not be in writ-
ing." 
Again we have on page 657 of 16 Cal. Jur. under the title 
Operation and Effect: 
"Article 12. In General. 
Although the old maxim of the civil law from 
which the modern doctrine of lis pendens evolved 
was phrased in the Latin words "pendente lite nil 
innovetur." the doctrine has never been held, in 
cases to which it has been applied in California, to 
have the effect of rendering conveyances made pen-
dente lite absolutely null and void. It simply holds 
the interest of the losing party subservient to the 
relief sought by the plaintiff, and charges all per-
sons with constructive notice of the suit and warns 
them that any dealings or meddlesome interfer-
ence with the subject matter of the action during 
the pendency thereof will avail them nothing in the 
event of a judgment or decree against their gran-
tor. The effect of a lis pendens is to make a sub-
sequent purchaser from a party a mere volunteer, 
who takes subject to any judgment that may be 
rendered in the action of the pendency of which 
notice is given. The purchasers or encumbrancers 
pendente lite are bound by the result of the judg-
ment or decree precisely as their grantors are, or 
would have been bound. Purchasers pending a 
mortgage foreclosure suit, not made parties there-
to, are, however, bound by the decree against their 
grantors only to the extent of the property describ-
ed in the complaint, decree and lis pendens." 
The case cited by appellant on page 7 of this brief be-
ing Alpha Stores Limited et al vs. Nobel et al 135 Pac. 2nd 
625, is not in point with the facts in this case, as the plain-
tiff Alpha Stores Limited et al got their title as an execu-
tion purchaser which is an independent sourse of title, 
while in the present case the plaintiff and respondent got 
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his title through the defendant and appellant, and can never 
have any better title than his grantor, Hess. When the 
court de·clared the tax title of Hess null and void, regard-
less of whether Briggs had notice of Hess's litigation with 
Tree or not, or whether we term him a bona fide purchaser 
for value, his title is no better than Hess's was. A suit by 
Briggs with Tree can avail Briggs absolutely nothing as he 
gets his title from Hess, Hess got his from void tax pro-
ceedings and a Court of Jurisdiction has so declared. The 
warranty has absolutely failed and Briggs is entitled to his 
damage. Defendant further contends that in the prior case 
of Laura Tree vs. Hess (page 7 and 8 of his brief), that the 
District Court was without jurisdiction to enter its decree 
in said matter. He claims the reason is that Laura Tree 
had not filed her lis pendens. At the same time in his brief, 
he shows that an action was filed by Laura Tree against F. 
W. Hess, but at the time the action was filed Hess was 
listed as the owner of the property under a tax proceeding 
and Tree the owner under a legal chain of title. During 
the period while the issues were being formed the defendant 
Hess sold the property and did not raise this issue before the 
Court during the litigation that followed. The court found 
that Hess's tax title was invalid and he now says that his 
decree in another matter is void and of no force and effect. 
It is in substance and effect a collateral attack, if anything, 
on a prior judgment where the parties are not the same. 
POINT III. THAT WHEN THE DIST'RICT COURT 
IN CIVIL SUIT No. 6586 (DEFENDANT'S EXHIIBIT No.1) 
DECLAREU THE TAX TITLE OF F. W. HESS, NULL 
AND VOID, THAT HIS WARRANTY OF TITLE THEN 
FAILED. THAT ANY GRANTEE OF HESS, WHETHER 
10 
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HE CLAIMED TO BE A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OR 
NOT WOULD NOT HAVE ANY BETTER TITLE THAN 
HESS, AND HESS HAD NONE. UNDER SUCH CIRCUM-
STANCES THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING 
JUDGl\fENT FOR PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT. 
The District Court entered its decree (plaintiff's exhi-
bit "B" and defendant's exhibit "1") and did therein de-
clare that the title of the defendants, F. W. Hess and wife, 
was void and of no force and effect and that the rights of 
any person claiming under him were of no force and effect. 
The record further shows that the plaintiff Biggs, if he had 
any title, had to obtain the same under the defendants, F. 
W. Hess and wife. The Warranty Deed of conveyance 
through which Briggs took his pretended title warranted 
that Hess was lawfully seized of the premises and that they 
had a good right to convey the same; that they guaranteed 
the grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet possession 
thereof; that the premises are free and clear from all en-
cumbrances and that the grantors, their heirs and personal 
representatives will forever warrant and defend the title 
thereof in the grantee, his heirs and assigns against all 
lawful claims whatsoever, (Utah Code Annotated 78-1-11). 
The decree entered by the court, in effect proved the de-
struction of the warranty made by the defendant Hess. 
The first covenant referred to above was the Covenant 
of Seisin and the right to convey. Thompson on Real 
Property, Volume 7, Article 3687 page 169 reads: 
" A " covenant of seisin" is defined to be "an 
assurance to the purchaser that the grantor has the 
very estate in quantity and quality which he pur-
ports to convey," and extends not only to the land 
11 
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itself, but also to whatever is properly appurten-
ant to and passes by the conveyance of the land. 
It is a covenant in praesenti, which is broken, if 
at all, as soon as made. The covenant of seisin 
does not extend to a title already vested in the 
grantee but is broken only by a paramount title 
existing in a third person. Such covenant, "is, 
when broken, a chose in action, not assignable at 
common lay, and this rule still obtains" in North 
Carolina. In North Dakota, however, by virtue 
of statute, the cause of action for breach of a cove-
nant of seisin is capable of assignment. It em-
braces possession and the right to convey. It is 
breached if a good title in fee-simple absolute, with 
right of possession, is not in the grantor when the 
deed is delivered. It is broken if there is a mater-
ial deficiency in the quantity of land called for by 
the deed. It is broken, also, if the grantor has not 
substantially the very estate he under takes to 
convey. If he undertakes to convey the whole es-
tate in fee absolutely, the covenant of seisin is of 
course broken .if he has no estate ; and it is broken 
if there is an outstanding estate in another, such 
as the estate of a life tenant; but it is not broken 
by the existance of easements or encumbrances 
not striking at the technical seisin of the grantee, 
and a mortgage or an expectant right of dower does 
not affect the covenant. This covenant does ont 
extend to a title already existing in the grantee, 
but only to title existing in a third person. 
This covenant is in legal effect a covenant of 
title as well as a covenant of possession, and is 
broken unless the grantor's deed vests in the gran-
tee an indefeasible estate in the land conveyed. 
The covenant of right to convey is practically 
synonymous with the covenant of seisin. This 
covenant, like the covenant of seisin, is one in 
praesenti and, if broken, the breach occurs at the 
moment of its creation, the covenant in effect be-
ing that a particular state of things exist at that 
time." 
Briggs immediately called upon his grantor to make 
12 
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good his warranty by purchasing from Laura Tree et al 
the said property for the benefit of Briggs, the plaintiff. 
That notice and demand went unheaded. Briggs, on the 
other hand, is entitled to rely upon his warranty and sue 
for his damage thus suffered, because of the failure of 
Seisin and right to convey has been established by the de-
cree in Tree vs. Hess Supra. On the other hand if he 
should have attempted to litigate said matter he must lose 
said litigation, as his grantor's title came from a tax title 
and had been declared void. His pretended title, having 
come from a void tax sale, even if it could be proved that he 
was a purchaser for value from Hess, he has no better title 
than Hees had and Hess's title originates from a void tax 
proceeding. Consequently the court did not err when in 
substance and effect it said to Mr. Hess: "You sold proP-
erty under a written warranty." "Your written warranty 
was broken at the time you gave your deed, and was so 
proven by the suit brought against you by Mrs. Tree." 
"You were given an opportunity to make good the warranty 
and you failed." "Your grantee had to pay out $484.68 be-
cause your warranty failed and as a consequence your gran-
tee is entitled to his damage." 
CONCLUSION: 
1. As a conclusion from the foregoing, plaintiff and 
respondent contends under the pleadings and issues under 
which said matter was tried, that the judgment should be 
confirmed. 
2. That any affirmative defense must be specially 
pleaded and that the same, having not been pleaded can-
not be raised in the Supreme Court for the first time. 
13 
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3. That the warranty of title by Hess failed when he 
issued his deed and the fact was proven when judgment was 
entered against him in Civil Suit No. 6586, between Tree 
and him and plaintiff and respondent was then entitled to 
his damage as determined by the court. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
WALTER G. MANN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Respondent 
First Security Bank Bldg .. 
Brigham City, Utah 
14 
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